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This paper investigates the way in which certain economic and financial aspects of working-class life were ordered and regulated by the civil law in Victorian England. The law, I will suggest, both embodied and justified middle-class views about the latent fecklessness and immorality of manual workers and about the latent industry and honesty of the propertyowning classes. These legal interpretations of the different behavioural characteristics of the different classes were not new --the existence of class law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has been clearly demonstrated by a number of social historians. However, the way in which class-based legal prejudice was combined with the supposedly value-free operation of untrammelled market competition makes the working of class law in Victorian times distinct from that of earlier periods.
I will suggest that at the very time when manual workers were being incorporated into the Victorian state structure through a grudging recognition of trade union and political rights, they were being actively discriminated against in other areas of the civil law. Legal barriers were erected in the path of working-class self-help activity and increasingly harsh sanction was imposed on any personal financial lapse not because of the economic circumstances of manual workers but because of their social class.
The nature of class division in Victorian society recently has been challenged by a number of revisionist historians who identify a flexible and multi-layered respectability rather than class as the fulcrum around which social relations were articulated.! By contrast this paper argues that there was a deeply entrenched middle-class mid-Victorian prej udice against the character and behaviour of manual workers as a class, a prejudice which was embodied in the civil law and which has exerted a powerful long-term influence on class relationships and self-perceptions. Despite the growing acceptance of collectivist ideology and action from the 1880s and the public promotion of social opportunities via education, housing, health and welfare policies, Victorian class law continued to discriminate against many manual workers and sustain the moral basis of class division well into the twentieth-century.
The argument will be developed by looking in turn at the institutional and legal constraints on thrift and on personal indebtedness in Victorian England, but the paper begins by reviewing historical interpretations of the reform of the civil law in nineteenth-century England.
I
The civil law in England was transformed in the Victorian period as archaic and customary procedures and court structures were replaced by a more streamlined, more professional legal system that was better suited to the new requirements of a growing industrial urban economy.2 Nowhere was this more apparent than in the regulation of economic transactions.
Customary control of trade through guilds, apprenticeships and monopolies was gradually replaced by a more rational regulation under a revised law of contract which had no place for the fading vestiges of what Edward
Thompson has described as the eighteenth-century "moral economy". 3 In his study of the evolution of freedom of contract in England, Patrick Atiyah has noted that:
[t]here was simply a clash of moralities between the older, laxer, more paternal, protective Equity; and the newer individualism, stressing risk-taking, free choice, rewards to the enterprising and sharp, and devil take the hindmost.
Throughout the eighteenth century these two moralities coexisted uneasily; generally the older morality had the upper hand at first, but increasingly gave way as the century wore on. 4 According to Atiyah it is in the period 1770-1870 that one can see the emergence within the civil law of principles of freedom of trade and contract closely associated with the ideals of classical political economy and far removed from the traditional concerns of the eighteenth-century "moral economy".5 This was certainly the case at the local level where the amateur courts of requests were replaced in 1846 by professional and formal county courts which paid little attention to established principles of custom, discretion and local participation. 6 Not until the late nineteenth-century collectivist developments in socia l thought and the Edwardian "new liberal"
social legislation was the primacy of free-market individualism convincingly challenged. In the civil law the protective and ameliorative functions of eighteenth-century concepts of equity were reintroduced through forma l legislation relating to health, safety, adulteration, hours of work and minimum wages.
This interpretation of the incursion of free-market ideals into social, poli tical and legal thought in Victorian England is long established. 7 but it is not necessarily well established. This paper will attempt to demonstrate that in one area of law and practice, the small but crucial area relating to the money management of the working class, the free market was reined-in before it had a chance to develop. A contract economy --one in which all economic actors are treated according to the same free-market rules --was rapidly made subservient to moral prejudice. Economic actions undertaken by people of different social standing became regulated in different ways because of a priori value judgements about the character traits of the different classes.
Class law, of course, was not new to England. The class bias in both the criminal and civil law in eighteenth-century England has been well documented. It was a bias that included discrimination in the definition of crimes and misdemeanours, in the prosecution of defendants from different socio-economic backgrounds, and in the corrective treatment of offenders. s
But nineteenth-century law reform, on both the civil and criminal sides, was intended to produce a more rational, formal and equitable legal system.
This was particularly the case in the law of contract, where arbitrary or historical rights and entitlements were gradually replaced by a more genera l law relating to bargains openly entered into by the contracting parties. 9 A developing sense of legal formalism was supposed to ensure equal treatment before the law for the economic actors who made their agreements in the free market. But despite this legal rhetoric (which reflected, no doubt, the sincere beliefs of many lawyers), the practice was different. In many aspects of both the civil law and of public administrative practice which touched the economic and financial affairs of the working class, new biases against the interests of workers were deliberately introduced by parliament and the courts. Furthermore these biases became incorporated within the social norms not just of the legal establishment, but of the population as a whole, thereby legitimizing the underlying class prejudice.
In order to analyze these developments, the next two sections of this paper will focus on the self-help activities of manual workers, and will show the way in which legislation and procedure relating to working-class thrift and personal indebtedness incorporated class bias. The final section will then suggest why this class bias was generally accepted rather than contested, even by manual workers and their representatives, and will examine the implications of this argument for revisionist interpretations of class divisions in Victorian society.
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In so far as Victorian middle-class advocates of working-class thrift acknowledged any class bias in the operation of thrift institutions, it was in a positive sense of the poor being encouraged in their self-help efforts through subsidization and charitable assistance. insurance organisations. 25 The state provided no subsidy but took no cut;
this was self-contained working-class self-help. Working-class families were not, however, allowed to pursue this effort at thrift untouched by the value judgements of middle-class legislators because of a belief, ultimately enshrined in legislation, that the baseness of many elements within the working class left them only one step away from infanticide.
In 1846 parliament forbade any insurance on the life of a child under I find always mothers willing and very ready to make every sacrifice to keep their children alive, and it seems to me to be the case that the most thrifty of the very poor always insure. I
do not find in my experience anyone who has not that maternal affection for their children which it seems to be the general opinion that we lack as poor people. 34
Whether it was the sentiments of Will Crooks or the business lobbying of wi tnesses from the Prudential, Royal Liver, Liverpool Victoria and other insurance organisations which persuaded the select committee to maintain the status quo is unclear, but no further changes were made to the regulations restricting infant and child assurance until after the First World
War. Nevertheless, the financial limits, and the moral implications of these remained. Legislation enshrined a middle-class belief that the customs and habits of many workers were so base that they would be prepared to kill their children for an insurance pay-out of just £6. abolished imprisonment for debt. 35 As Gerry Rubin has pointed out in his excellent study of this legislation, these enactments appeared to represent the triumph of rational economic calculus over punitive barbarism in the regulation and recovery of debt:
the abolition of imprisonment for debt and the expansion of bankruptcy proceedings were two sides of the same coin, in that the structural principles of bankruptcy law on the one hand and of civil proceedings against the body on the other, stand in contradiction to one another. While the object of the former is to enable creditors to share equitably and to permit debtors to undergo a laundering process, offering them the opportunity of a fresh start free from debt, the object of committals was, by contrast, to substitute imprisonment for payment of debt. The former procedure aimed to be economically rational, the latter to be punitive or obstructive to economic efficiency.36
In theory the equality and openness required in a contract economy had been established, but in practice new moral constraints were introduced into laws regulating indebtedness with the result that the poor were in effect criminalized for their poverty and forced to repay all they owed, whilst What conception of the legal process did these working-class debtors gain from their court experience? Rough and summary justice is probably the best description. Once a plaint had been entered in the court book a summons was served on the defendant stating the substance of the action and the date of a court hearing. When the case came to court it was seldom decided in the interests of the defendant --his chances were never better than 2: 100 and usually nearer 1:100 throughout the period. The unlikelihood of winning the case and the cost of losing a day's wages persuaded many defendants not to attend these initial hearings and if they did attend they were given scant opportunity to explain their circumstances; in West
Hartlepool cases were heard and judgements were dispensed at the rate of one every 85 seconds. Judgements normally awarded the full claim plus costs to the creditor; costs and fees typically amounted to something over 30
per cent of the value of the debt.
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Compare this with middle-class debtors. Traders and, from 1861, nontraders who owed substantial debts could file a petition in bankruptcy.
Debtors had to be fairly wealthy in order to go bankrupt, because a £10 fe e was charged in order to file a petition for bankruptcy, a figure somewhat greater than the average per capita financial resources of working-class adults in the late-Victorian and Edwardian period. 40 Bankruptcy status protected the assets of the debtor from summary seizure by the creditors, and also wrote off much of the debt, because if the bankrupt paid out of his existing assets lOs. in the £, or a lesser composition acceptable to his creditors, he was discharged. It was argued that the rules of bankruptcy were required both to ensure a speedy and efficient distribution of assets to creditors, and to provide some protection of house and home for the bankrupt and his dependents. Implicit in these rules was the idea that the bankrupt was an unfortunate victim of market pressures, and the low level of composition required to discharge the debt was a strong incentive for creditors to extend further credit in the hope of achieving full repayment rather than force foreclosure. In consequence the number of bankruptcies was quite small --in 1897, for instance, there were 7282 bankruptcies, compared with over 1.1 million plaints for recovery of small debts.
It was not just the very different financial treatment, with smaJl debtors paying 100 per cent of the debt plus costs, and bankrupts paying usuaJly only 10s. in the £, and sometimes much less, that led some radical commentators to describe the laws relating to recovery of debt as class laws. 41 More important, perhaps, was the way in which the courts effectively This did not change even with the complete abolition of imprisonment for debt in 1869 because a new twist was introduced which allowed worlcingclass debtors to be imprisoned for contempt of court. Debtors could still be incarcerated for up to 6 weeks if they defaulted on payments to creditors, and if it could be proved to the satisfaction of the court that the defaulter either at the time of default or at some time since the date of the judgement had possessed the means to pay, and had refused or neglected to pay. In other words, if an instalment of the debt was not made on time, and if it could be demonstrated that at any time since the first court hearing the debtor had been in receipt of an income which permitted some discretionary expenditure --for instance 'where it has been clearly proved that the debtor was spending money on drink' --then the debtor was guilty of contempt. 45 The possibility that at the time of default the debtor might again be An universal system of ready money payment among the working-classes is impossible. The credit they obtain is on the faith of repayment not out of assets which can be touched by a fi . fa. but out of their periodical earnings, and this tacit engagement between the parties can only be enforced, in the majority of cases, by fear of imprisonment. 47 The procedure of debt repayment adopted by the county courts widened still further the disparity between the treatment of middle-class bankrupts and worki ng-class debtors. Once a petition in bankruptcy was filed, a bankrupt's subsequent income was untouched by the bankruptcy proceedings.
Bankruptcy was a way of distributing existing assets to creditors, not a way of imposing some sort of attachment to the bankrupt's future earnings. But the system of repayment by instalment used in the county courts was a direct imposition on the worker's future income, an imposition which in some instances could run for many months. the stigma that had attached to poverty in the aftermath of the New Poor Law and in the turmoil of the thirties and forties gradually disappeared; whatever stigma remained was reserved for the dependent and unrespectable poor, those who existed on the margins of or were outcasts from society. The bulk of the poor, the "working classes" as they were increasingly called, were seen as respectable, deserving, worthy, endowed with the puritan virtues which had served the middle classes so well, and which were shortly to earn the working classes that coveted badge of respectability, the suffrage. 63 More recently Himmelfarb has argued that the moral expectations embodied in late-Victorian middle class social attitudes were not" lofty or exalted", that "[t]hese virtues depended on no special breeding, talent, sensibility or even money. They were common, everyday virtues, within the capacity of ordinary people".64 In the light of the evidence surveyed in this paper, it would seem that these revisionist historians present a misleading "one nation" Tory-progressive interpretation of Victorian middle-class attitudes.
In practice, the poor were not seen as respectable and endowed with middle-class puritan virtues. Although middle-class thoughts about middleclass morals clearly did change in a liberal direction in this mid-Victorian period, the morals of the poor were kept quite distinct. Boyd Hilton has traced this reformation of middle-class attitudes towards money, trade and debt. "Liberal Tory or Peelite economists", he notes, "had regarded debt as sinful, and their dear money policies had been designed to make things difficult for those who sinned", but new economic opportunities and the new economic problems of regular fluctuati ons in the trade cycle demanded a new moral outlook. Reform of the bankruptcy and debt laws and the introduction of limited liability marked the victory of this new moral view, but, as Hilton has noted, these reforms "can be stigmatized as a gross example of middle-class selfishness".65
The mora l legitimation of middle-class default encapsulated by the bankruptcy and limited liability legislation can be seen as "the moment when the middle classes suddenly opted out of the capitalist system at the point where it stood to damage themselves. Hitherto they had been able to justify its inequality with the thought that they were not only more diligent and resou rceful, but also more daring than the workers, and consequently more vulnerable".66 But from the late 1860s the stark inequality that was incorporated in the institutional and legal regulation of thrift and indebtedness could no longer be justified by the economics of differential risk. It instead came to be justified by the alleged difference in the moral characteristics of the rich and the poor. Far from manual workers being seen as endowed with middle class puritan virtues, they were repeatedly characterized in juridical discussion and in more general middle-class social discourse as morally different in a fundamentally inferior way. This was a deeply divisive class outlook, but it was projected from above rather than below, an attitude much more of middle class exclusion than of working-class ambition.
Legal discrimination against workers pervaded many other areas of the civil law --for instance with respect to gambling, drinking and divorce --but this paper has focu sed specifically on the money management of the working class because this activity, above all others, should have been the least subject to any kind of moral imposition in a genuine contract economy. In practice the economic activities of workers were consistently regulated in accordance with middle-class prejudices about the character weaknesses of the masses, and these middle-class moral prejudices assumed the position of general social norms. No doubt these norms held greater sway in the Inns of Court and the London clubs than in the workingmen's clubs and local inns, but they appear seldom to have been seriously challenged before the Second World War.
Even after the war the moral precepts of the mid-Victorian legislation continued to hold sway in the legal establishment, though increasingly they appeared to be at odds with broader social attitudes. Atiyah explains the ideological conservatism of the law thus:
when lawyers encounter ideas from outside the law, as they do from time to time, they tend to absorb a smattering of these ideas which may then remain with them , handed down from generation to generation, until they emerge from their narrow professional interests to look at the same problem perhaps fifty or a hundred years later.
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In the case of working-class debtors, it took 101 years for the theoretical abolition of imprisonment for small debts in 1869 to be made a reality.
